The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and
survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform
all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest
degree subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their
providential attention to all other things, and in the mutations of
human affairs. I think therefore, that this is apparent to every one,
that every where that which governs according to nature, and pays all
possible attention to the felicity of the governed, after this manner
becomes the leader of that which it governs, and directs it to that
which is best. For neither has the pilot who rules over the sailors and
the ship any other precedaneous end than the safety of those that sail
in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does the physician who is the
curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things for the sake of any
thing else than the health of the subjects of his care, whether it be
requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative medicine. Nor
would the general of an army or a guardian say that they look to any
other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded, and
the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom
it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour
to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business
to procure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner
every thing belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant
that the Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their
providence extends to all things, since they are good, and possess
every virtue, how is it possible they should neglect the felicity of
the objects of their providential care? Or how can they be inferior
to other leaders in the providence of subordinate natures? Since the
Gods indeed always look to that which is better, and establish this as
the end of all their government, but other leaders overlook the good
of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, in consequence of being
perverted by the gifts of the depraved.