The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
If, however, you investigate the mode of the knowledge and truth of
the Gods, concerning all things that have a subsistence in any respect
whatever, it is ineffable and incomprehensible by the projecting
energies of the human intellect; but is alone known to the Gods
themselves. And I indeed admire those Platonists that attribute to
intellect the knowledge of all things, of individuals, of things
preternatural, and in short, of evils, and on this account establish
intellectual paradigms of these. But I much more admire those who
separate the intellectual peculiarity from divine union. For intellect
is the first fabrication and progeny of the Gods. These therefore
assign to intellect whole and first causes, and such as are according
to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of adorning and
generating all things. For _the one_ is every where, but whole
is not every where. And of _the one_ indeed matter participates
and every being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera,
all things do not participate. All things therefore are alone from
the Gods, and real truth is with them who know all things unically.
For on this account also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all
things, wholes and parts, things eternal, and such as are generated
through the whole of time. For being exempt from eternal beings,
and from those that exist in time, they contract in themselves the
knowledge of each and of all things, according to one united truth. If
therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the Gods, we must not
say that a thing of this kind originates from the Gods, but from the
recipients, or the instruments, or the places, or the times. For all
these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and when
they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure
illumination of the truth which is established in them. But when they
are separated from the Gods through inaptitude, and become discordant
with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. What
kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods,
who produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be
with those who establish in themselves the whole of truth? In the same
manner, as it appears to me, the Gods extend good to all things, but
always that which is willing and able receives the extended good, as
Socrates says in the Phædrus. And a divine nature indeed is causeless
of evil, but that which departs from it, and gravitates downward, is
elongated through itself; thus also, the Gods indeed are always the
suppliers of truth, but those natures are illuminated by them, who are
lawfully their participants. For the Elean wise man says, that the eye
of the soul in the multitude, is not strong enough to look to the truth.