The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
We shall begin, therefore, from the Republic; for here Socrates clearly
shows that _the good_ is established above being, and the whole
intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the
sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing
visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative
of light, so it is necessary _the good_ should be with reference
to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of
truth,--if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one
and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that
_the good_ transcends the natures which are always intellective, and
also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, however, to
hear the Platonic words themselves: “You may say that the sun not only
imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he
is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being
himself generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which
are known, have not only this from _the good_ that they are known,
but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst
_the good itself_ is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it
both in dignity and in power.” Through all these things, therefore,
it is evident how _the good_ and the first principle are defined by
Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the
intelligible extent, and essence itself, according to union, in the
same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures,
and perfects and generates all things by his light. How, therefore,
following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things,
and the cause of all things? How can we assert that being itself[145]
and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all
the divine progressions? For essence and intellect are said to subsist
primarily from _the good_, to have their hyparxis about _the good_,
to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to
obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of
this light, which is more divine than intellect itself and essence,
as being primarily suspended from _the good_, and affording in beings
a similitude to that which is first. For the light which is emitted
from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the
participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible
boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light
which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself,
and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual
participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light
being appropriately imparted to it.[146] And in short, every divine
nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is
through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore,