In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last order of intellectuals, proceeding from _the one_, and subordinate to it. For in this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at the same time _the one_ subsists prior to both these. For different is said to be different both from itself and from other things. And in a similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things. But _the one_ is not indeed different from itself, because that which is different from _the one_ will be not one. And it is not the same with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is _the one_ different from other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not _the one_. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not _the one_. Nor is _the one_ the same with itself. For if _the one_ and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one by participating of the many. But if _the one_ and sameness are essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to _the one_, it should become a passive one, and not that which is primarily one. If however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad, it is evident that _the one_ existing beyond this also supernally unfolds it into light, and places over the wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For from hence other things primarily receive a communication with _the one_ which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by _the one_. But after the intellectual Gods, the ineffable transcendency of _the one_ arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, _the one_ in the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uniformly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore, Parmenides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in the same manner as dissimilitude is that which is passive to difference. Parmenides therefore demonstrates that _the one_ transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according to similitude and dissimilitude.