The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and
different animals a different portion, according to their respective
natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of
life; since we say that qualities and all passions, and the last of
bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do
not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more
ancient than life; life than intellect; and intellect than soul. For
it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being
more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside
over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very
properly therefore, does Plato in the Timæus give subsistence to
soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own
nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to
a sphere fashioned by a wheel.[171] For that which is moved, is moved
by participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about
motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera
of things, and from motion. For being, says he, according to its own
nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither
stands still nor is moved, is beyond eternal life.
These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence,
viz. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of
all the causes prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own
peculiarity, but intellect, life and being, from more ancient causes.
Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold
manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as
far as to bodies; according to its life, all things which are said to
live, even as far as to plants; according to its intellect, all things
which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational
natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that
are able to participate of it.[172] But intellect being established
beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns
all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination
the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but
supplying the participation of life to a still greater number, and of
being to all those to whom primary being imparts itself. But life being
arranged above intellect, presubsists as the cause of the same things
in a twofold respect, vivifying secondary natures indeed, together with
intellect, and filling from itself with the rivers of life, such things
as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally
producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily
being generates all things by its very existence, all lives, and
intellects and souls, and is uniformly present to all things, and is
exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives
subsistence to all things.