The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
multitude of the third triad, and comprehending it on all sides. The
being however, which gives completion to this triad is mixed, in the
same manner as the being of the triad prior to it, and receives the
peculiarity of life. For the infinity in this generates life.
It is likewise necessary that this triad should participate of the
three things, symmetry, truth, and beauty. That which is primarily
being however, principally subsists according to symmetry, which unites
it, and conjoins it to _the good_. But the second triad, principally
subsists according to truth. For because it participates of that which
is primarily being, it is being, and _truly_ being. And the third triad
principally subsists according to the beautiful. For there intelligible
multitude, order and beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this
being is the most beautiful of all intelligibles. This however will
be discussed hereafter. As there is a triad therefore, in each of
the mixtures, the first indeed, symmetry especially comprehends and
connects; the second truth, and the third beauty. And this induced
the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato in these three defines the
whole of the intelligible [order]. For all are in each, but one of
these predominates more in one of the intelligible monads than in
another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the view after
this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should also be
deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings
are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are
the unities more numerous than beings; but each progression of being
participates of _the one_; since this universe also, according to each
part of itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a much greater
priority therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and
last hypostases, participate of the intelligible Gods.
CHAPTER XIV.