The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect,
we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad
is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the
intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things
in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity.
Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the
Timæus, the demiurgus calls himself father, “Of which works I am the
demiurgus and _father_.” But shortly after he unfolds his power,
“Imitating my _power_ in your generation.” This therefore is also
wonderful, that he has delivered to us the most theological conception
concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the
power of the father, when he says, “Of which works I am the demiurgus
and father,” and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,]
“Imitating my power:” so that according to Plato power is of the
father. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity
generative of the whole of things; for this is evident from the words
“In your generation.” Power therefore is the cause of generation and
of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the
intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. “Having thus spoke, again
into the former crater in which he had tempered the soul of the
universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.” For
to pour, to mingle, mixture, and to be productive of soul, pertain to
intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things,
since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. “Whatever
ideas therefore _intellect_ perceived by the dianoëtic energy
in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for
this universe to contain.” Hence the demiurgus is father, and power
and intellect. And he possesses these things as much as possible on
account of intelligibles. For he is a God as father, on account of
them. He is also power, and the generator of wholes, and knows beings
intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge
first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in
intelligibles; from which also the demiurgus being filled, participates
of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as
the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible
eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of
which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding
according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the
demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual
and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is
generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these
names from Plato is evident from what has been said.