The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the
infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume
the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of
things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the
union, but the latter of the separation of multitude, Parmenides calls
the first and intelligible multitude infinite, because all multitude
indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny
of the first infinity. All intelligible multitude, however, is a thing
of this king. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself.
But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity.
Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this account infinite, as
unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same
with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all, and as
far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through
the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite.
For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible
multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed
that which is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity,
it would be requisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite
multitude of this kind. Since, however, the intelligible is infinite
power, it is necessary that the participant of the primarily infinite,
should cause infinity to shine forth according to the power which is
comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it be requisite to relate my
own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that
which is primarily multitude is infinite multitude. For it receives the
whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings,
as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing
power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an
incomprehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude,
it bounds and measures it by infinite power, and through wholeness
introduces bound to all things. These things, therefore, may be assumed
from Parmenides concerning the third intelligible triad.
CHAPTER XXVII.