The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligibles
to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to
ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt
from all the other divine orders, and is neither called intelligible
as known by a partial intellect, nor as comprehended by intelligence
in conjunction with reason, nor yet as preexisting in all-perfect
intellect. For it transcends both total and partial intelligibles,
and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable
and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same
transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as _the
one_ with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible
is imparticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual
orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses
this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived
to all things from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same
time exempt from intellect, existing itself by itself; and at the same
time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an
intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the coordinate being
derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is
imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent,
and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible
simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we
are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these _the one_
becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of
essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation
and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual
multitude. Hence I do not place intelligible simplicity in the order
of idea. For this form is partial, and is subordinate to intelligible
union. But I consider it as the hyparxis of divine natures, and as
generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine
natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness
of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine
self-sufficiency and divine power, according to which the Gods fill
all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the
intelligible Gods, because they are united to _the good_, wholly
full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they
contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very properly,
therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable
principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union;
subsisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude
uniformly and unically; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and
being uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as _the good_
illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods