The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being,
but participated by intellect. But this is the same thing as to assert
that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills
intellect from itself. For being is the intelligible, but life is
intelligence. And being indeed is characterized according to a divine
hyparxis; but life according to power; and intellect according to
intelligible intellect. For as being is to hyparxis, so is intellect
to being. And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so is
life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated
from the one and hyparxis, but constitutes in conjunction with _the
one_ the nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and
gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being.
As also _the one itself_ which exists prior to being, imparts to
being from itself a second unity, so likewise life being allotted an
hypostasis prior to intellect, generates intellectual life. For true
being and the intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life
and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which
participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is
generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this
medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals,
is illuminated by Gods who are allotted a union secondary to the
occult subsistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause
the separation of intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible,
simple, and primary nature of intelligibles, subsides, through
the medium of these Gods into multitude and separation, and the
inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the
Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle
of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and carried in the divisions
of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same
time intellectual; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles,
but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible Gods
intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible
which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the
intellectual Gods another: and we denominate the Gods that subsist
according to life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not
as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according
to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intellect the power
of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of
being intellectually perceived, but we give them this appellation, as
deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating
all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed
with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according
to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in common,