The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Again therefore, if indeed the supercelestial place is the
imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we
establish so great a divine multitude there, and this accompanied with
separation, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow,
and Adrastia? For neither do the fountains of the virtues, nor the
separation and variety of forms, pertain to the intelligible Gods.
For the first and most unical of forms extend the demiurgic intellect
of wholes to the intelligible paradigm, and the comprehension of
forms which is there. But Socrates in the Phædrus says that a partial
intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this intellect
is the governor of the soul, as it is well said by the philosophers
prior to us. If therefore, it be necessary from this analogy to
investigate the difference of intelligibles, as the demiurgic intellect
indeed, is imparticipable, but a partial intellect is participable,
so with respect to the intelligible, one indeed which is the first
paradigm of the demiurgus, pertains to the first intelligibles, but
another which is the first paradigm of a partial intellect pertains
to the second intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are
allotted an intelligible transcendency, as subsisting at the summit of
intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is beyond the celestial
circulation, but is inferior to those intelligible triads, because it
is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, and is not unknown, is
divided according to a multitude of forms, and possesses a variety of
powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible
to them, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with ineffable
union, but not being known by them through intelligence;--if this be
the case, it is certainly necessary that the supercelestial place
should subsist between the intelligible nature, and the celestial
circulation. If Plato himself also admits that essence which truly is,
exists in this place, how is it possible that he should not also admit
it to be intelligible, and to participate of the first intelligibles?
For because indeed it is essence it is intelligible; but because it
truly is, it participates of being.