The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of
intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection
proceeding every where. This therefore[223] is the peculiarity of
the third monad. But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second; and
intelligible plenitude of the first. For all the supercelestial place
is indeed illuminated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures
that are contained in it are called true. And Socrates says, “that
whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality
shall be free from damage, till another period takes place.” For every
thing in that place is truly being and intelligible, and is full of
divine union. In the first monads however [i.e. in the plain of truth
and the meadow,] this intelligible light subsists contractedly, and
is occultly established as it were in the adyta; but in the third
monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods] it shines forth,
and is co-expanded, and is co-divided with the multitude of powers.
We may therefore from these things survey the differences of the
three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses.
But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the
second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad
will be perfectly apparent. And does not science which is stable, and
the uniform intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is
consubsistent with intelligibles, pertain to the power which is united
to the intelligible father, and which does not proceed, nor separate
its union from the deity of that father? but does not the genus of
justice pertain to the power which is divided, which separates the
intellectual genera, leads the intelligible multitude into order, and
imparts by illumination distribution according to desert? And does not
the genus of temperance pertain to the power which is the medium of
both these, which is converted to itself, and possesses the common bond
of this triad? For the harmonic, and a communication with the extremes
according to reason, are the illustrious good of this middle power.