The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
And in the first place, we shall define what that is, about which our
discourse against them will be employed; for this, I think, will render
the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning divine natures, apparent in
the highest degree. There are, therefore, nine hypotheses which are
discussed by Parmenides in this dialogue, as we have evinced in our
commentaries upon it. And the five precedaneous hypotheses suppose that
_the one_ has a subsistence, and through this hypothesis, that all
beings, the mediums of wholes, and the terminations of the progressions
of things, may be supposed to subsist. But the four hypotheses
which follow these, introduce _the one_, not having a subsistence,
according to the exhortation of the dialectic method, show that by
taking away _the one_, all beings, and such things as have an apparent
existence, must be entirely subverted, and propose to themselves the
confutation of this hypothesis. And some of the hypotheses evidently
conclude every thing according to reason, but others (if I may be
allowed the expression) perfectly evince things more impossible than
impossibilities; which circumstance some prior to us perceiving, as
it appears to me, necessarily to happen in these hypotheses, have
considered it as deserving discussion,[100] in their treatises on this
dialogue.
With respect to the first of the hypotheses therefore, almost all agree
in asserting, that Plato through this celebrates the superessential
principle of wholes, as ineffable, unknown, and above all being.
But all do not explain the hypothesis posterior to this after the
same manner. For the ancient Platonists, and those who participated
the philosophy of Plotinus assert that an intellectual nature
presents itself to the view in this hypothesis, subsisting from the
superessential principle of things, and endeavour to harmonize to the
one and all-perfect power of intellect, such conclusions as are the
result of this hypothesis. But that leader of ours to truth about
the Gods, and confabulator of Plato (that I may use the language of
Homer) who transferred what was indefinite in the theory of the more
ancient philosophers, to bound, and reduced the confusion of the
different orders to an intellectual distinction, in the writings which
he communicated to his associates;--this our leader, in his treatise
on the present subject, calls upon us to adopt a distinct division
of the conclusions, to transfer this division to the divine orders,
and to harmonize the first and most simple of the things exhibited to
the first of beings; but to adapt those in the middle rank to middle
natures, according to the order which they are allotted among beings;
and such as are last and multiform, to ultimate progressions. For
the nature of being is not one, simple, and indivisible; but as in
sensibles, the mighty heaven is one, yet it comprehends in itself a
multitude of bodies; and the monad connectedly contains multitude, but