The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane
soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is
analogous to the sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a
divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light.
Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they are
conformable to the Orphic traditions. “For, says he,[165] Orpheus does
not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual
order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this
appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names.
For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where,
therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible,
in order that we may understand the divine conception of Plato? Orpheus
therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication,
analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and
from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number
of souls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed
(i.e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround
him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that
all his other fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods
whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone
was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For
since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls
and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and
distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible,
being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in one
intellection;--this being the case, he says that the intellectual
essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva.
For says he,
The intellectual heart alone was left,
directly calling it intellectual.