In the next place let us direct our attention to the Parmenides of Plato, and see how in that most theological dialogue the mundane Gods are characterized. In the first hypothesis therefore of that dialogue, in which all the divine orders are denied of _the one_, Parmenides characterizes the mundane Gods by the equal and the unequal as follows: “But since _the one_ is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or less than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the less quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of less; and with respect to the other of greater measures. How should it not? Is it not therefore impossible that a thing which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same? It is impossible. It will therefore neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again, it will no longer be _the one_, but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure. It has, however, appeared that _the one_ cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. _The one_, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of _same_) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or less either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.”