The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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Farther still, in the Politicus, Plato more clearly suspends the second
life of the universe from Fate, after the departure of the one dæmon
that governed it, and the many dæmons that were the followers of that
one. Hence, he separates all the providential care of these powers
from the universe, and alone leaves it the government according to
Fate; the world, indeed, always possessing both these, but the fable
separating the first from the second. For he says, “that Fate and
connate desire convolve the world,” just as the Chaldæan oracles say,
“that unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws
downward in order that the heavens may run an eternal course; and
that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night and
day may be accomplished.” Thus, therefore, Plato also says, that the
second period of the world is convolved by Fate, and not the first and
intellectual period, all but clearly asserting that Fate is the power
which proximately moves the sensible world, and is suspended from
the invisible providence of the Gods. For establishing Necessity the
mother of the Fates prior to these, he represents her in the Republic
convolving[172] the world on her knees. And if it be requisite to give
my opinion, Plato arranges these three causes of order successive
to each other, viz. Adrastia, Necessity, and Fate; the first being
intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. For
the demiurgus as Orpheus says, was nourished indeed by Adrastia,
but associated with Necessity, and generated Fate. And as Adrastia
was comprehensive of divine institutions,[173] and the collector of
all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all the mundane
laws, which the demiurgus now inscribes in souls, that he may lead
them in conjunction with wholes, and may define what is adapted to
them according to the different elections of lives. Hence, a vicious
life tends to that which is dark and atheistical, but a pious life
leads the soul to the heavens to which she is also conducted by wholes;
because each of these lives is full of the laws of Fate; and souls
lead themselves, as Plotinus says, thither where the law that is in
them announces. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the
Gods, to conduct inwardly the subjects for which it provides. And
why is it wonderful that this should be the case, since Nature also
inserting material and corporeal-formed powers in bodies, moves them
through these powers; earth indeed through gravity, but fire through
levity. In a much greater degree, therefore, do the Gods move souls
through the powers which they disseminate in them. Hence, if they
lead souls according to the laws of Fate, these laws also subsist in
souls. And they pre-exist indeed intellectually in the demiurgus;
for the divine law is established with him. But they exist in divine
souls; for according to these laws they govern the universe. And they
are participated by partial souls; for through these they conduct