The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
The Chaldæan oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing
in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates
us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls
Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between
desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of
Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in
the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle
situation between each, congregating and collecting together that
which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from
better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites
intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain
life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks
[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says,
In his breast feeding, eyless, rapid Love.[182]
But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination
an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is
a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account
the Chaldæan oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a
copulator. For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all
following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins
all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it
conjoins us both with Gods and dæmons. In the Gods indeed it has a
primary subsistence; in dæmons a secondary one; and in partial souls
a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles.
Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods
is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence;
and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears
similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as
imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as
participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a
better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which
is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect
Tamæus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods
must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this
is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its
nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect;
for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner
as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the
third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and
which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we
consider Love as co-ordinate with this intellectual difference; for in
intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence.
And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to
cause.