The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For if it in no respect participates of _the one_, neither will the
whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude
consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from
each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of
these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For
participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole
of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it will
be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For each of
the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, will
either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which
consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each will
consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but in
energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any
being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not more
than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than each.
Nor is it possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. All
multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of _the one_.
PROPOSITION II.
Every thing which participates of _the one_, is both one and not
one.
* * * * *
For if it is not _the one_ itself (since it participates of _the one_)
being something else besides _the one_, it suffers, or is passive
to it according to participation, and sustains to become one. If,
therefore, it is nothing besides _the one_, it is one alone, and does
not participate of _the one_, but will be _the one itself_. But if
it is something besides _the one_, which is not _the one_, but its
participant, it is both _not one_, and _one_, not indeed such a one as
the one itself, but _one being_, as participating of _the one_. This,
therefore, is not one, nor is it that which _the one_ is. But it is
one, and at the same time a participant of _the one_. Hence, being
of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else
besides _the one_. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but
so far as it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore,
which participates of _the one_, is both one, and not one.
PROPOSITION III.
Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of
_the one_, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of _the
one_.
* * * * *