The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence
to all beings; for _the good_ and _the one_ are the same, so that the
boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things which
are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten
to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is
a certain portion of _the good_, and the perfect, so far as it is
perfect, imitates _the good_. But _the good_ gives subsistence to all
things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive according to nature
of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is
more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more
numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is
more perfect, participates in a greater degree of _the good_. It is,
therefore, nearer to _the good_. But this being the case, it is nearer
to the cause of all. And thus, it is the cause of a greater number of
effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more
imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which
it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every
thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives
subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or
fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a
greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces
a less number of each.
COROLLARY.
From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote
from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of
any thing. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something
posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most
remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself,
from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive
power, and besides[223] this, would imitate the cause which is
productive of all beings.
PROPOSITION XXVI.
Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in
itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are
successive.
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