The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For because such things as are first, are allied to those in a
superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in
the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect
proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and
ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole
series;--this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently
conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are
unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an
equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is
not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their
proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they
are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive
proximately the participations[257] of superior natures; while others
being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their
principles, are deprived of a power of this kind.
PROPOSITION CXI.
Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects,
receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects
alone. And of every psychical series, some things are intellectual
souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls
alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally
presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the
presence of souls.
* * * * *
For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended
from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect
in it, and sufficient to be connascent with superior natures.
Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but
those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these
are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of
participable intellect,[258] but such only as are most intellectual.
Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the
soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and
possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of
demonstration in all things.
PROPOSITION CXII.
Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the
natures prior to them.
* * * * *
For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude
to the natures placed above them,[259] and through the connexion and
coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior
natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest
genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the
superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of
subsistence as are the natures prior to them.
PROPOSITION CXIII.
Every divine number is unical.
* * * * *