The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or
intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that
every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other,
but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only.
Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of
the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential.
But that the first God is superessential,[261] is evident. For essence
is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be
united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is
both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something
else besides _the one_, and will participate of unity, but will not be
_the one itself_; or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence,
he will be indigent of _the one_. It is, however, impossible that _the
good_, and _the first_ should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and
therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of
that which it is primarily to the whole series [of which it is the
leader], hence, every divine number is superessential; since every
principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore,
the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be superessential.
For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they
are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the
monads of essences.
PROPOSITION CXVI.
Every deity except _the one_ is participable.
* * * * *
For that _the one_ is imparticipable is evident, since if it were
participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would
no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are
prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities
are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another
imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from _the
one_? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how
in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does
not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be _the
one itself_, but the other _one_ and _not one_. This _non-one_ also,
if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be _one_ alone. But if it is a
certain other hypostasis besides _the one_, in this case _the one_
will be participated by the _non-one_. And that will be a self-perfect
one, which conjoins the non-one with _the one_. So that again God will
be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one
will subsist in the participation of _the one_. Every unity, therefore,
which subsists after _the one_ is participable, and every God is
participable.
PROPOSITION CXVII.
Every God is the measure of beings.
* * * * *