For if the first God is _the one_ and _the good_, and so far as he is _the one_, he is also _the good_, and so far as _the good, the one_, if this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of _the one_, and the form of _the good_, according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of _the good_, and the form of _the one_, since the first is _the one_ and _the good_. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses. As, therefore, _the one_ of the Gods is superessential, so likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than _the one_. For each of them is not any thing else than _the good_, but is good alone; as neither is each any thing else than _the one_, but is one alone. PROPOSITION CXX. Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods. * * * * * For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize providentially through the participation of them. But providence is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary natures. And whence will that be derived which subsists according to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But providence (προνοια), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to intellect (ενεργεια εστι προ νου). The Gods, therefore, from being Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all things with the goodness which is prior to intellect. PROPOSITION CXXI. Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures. * * * * * For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of power, and predominates according to nature.