The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own
hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every
thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which
it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper
hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings
with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For
that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies
all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being,
not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other
things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures
according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other
things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of
their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that
which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes
without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is
an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being
separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they
would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the
peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness
to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it.
And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that
which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this
beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it
is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures
that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are
primarily good.
PROPOSITION CXXIII.
Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential
union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is
comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, _that which is
first_, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.
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