For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself in _the good_, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is every thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things, existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, because it is unical. PROPOSITION CXXVIII. Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium; but when participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or greater[265] number of media. * * * * * For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able[266] to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided multitude, through the representation of multitude. PROPOSITION CXXIX.