The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
PROPOSITION CXXXIV.
Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect,
but energizes providentially as a God.
* * * * *
For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and
to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a
God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This
communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished
through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to
themselves; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with
intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes
providentially, is a God; providence being established in an energy
prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things;
but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature
extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not
proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize
providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is
because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all
such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire
after good, and hasten to obtain it.
PROPOSITION CXXXV.
Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or
without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine
unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the
participating genera of beings.
* * * * *
For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For
since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that
which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is
effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided
manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined
with unity, and as _beings_ they are unconjoined with the unity which
is prior to beings, and as _many_, they are separated from unity. It
is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be
partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and
dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something
belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and according to
this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the participant should
be one, in order that according to this, it may be similar to _the
one_ which is participated, though of these, the latter is one in such
a manner as to be unity, but the former, so as to be passive to _the
one_, and to be united through the participation of unity.
PROPOSITION CXXXVI.