The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
I wish, however, to show from other writings of Plato what the
peculiarity is which he exhibits to us of the liberated order. In
the Republic, therefore, teaching us the order of the universe which
pervades through the mundane wholes, supernally from the inerratic
sphere, and which governs the elections of human life that are
different at different times, this life also varying the measure of
justice adapted to it, he refers the first-effective cause of this
order to a monad and triad exempt from [the mundane] wholes. And to the
monad indeed, he gives the power of dominion, extending the authority
of it to all heaven, its empire being at one and the same time
impartibly present to all things, governing all things indivisibly,
and according to one energy, and moving wholes by the lowest powers
of itself. Giving also to the triad a progression from the monad, he
distributes from it into the universe a partible energy and production.
For that which is simple and united in exempt providence, is educed
into multitude through secondary inspection. Thus, therefore, the one
cause of multitude possesses a greater authority, but the distributed
cause appears to be more proximate to its effects. For all the variety
of powers in the world, the infinity of motions, and the multiform
difference of reasons, [i.e. of productive principles] are convolved
under the triad of the Fates. But again this triad is extended to
the one monad which is prior to the three Fates, and which Socrates
denominates Necessity, not as ruling over wholes by violence, nor as
obliterating the self-motive nature of our life, nor as deprived of
intellect and the most excellent knowledge, but as comprehending all
things intellectually, and introducing bound to things indefinite, and
order to things inordinate. And farther still, he thus denominates it,
as causing all things to be obedient to itself, and extending them
to good, as subjecting them to demiurgic sacred laws, as guarding
all things within the world, and as comprehending all things in the
universe in a circle, and leaving nothing deprived of the justice
pertaining to it, nor suffering it, besides this, to fly from the
divine law.