The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
man knows good and evil he will never be overcome by any thing so as to
do any thing else but what knowledge bids him. Yet there are some who
say that they are overcome by pleasure or pain; but what is it to be
overcome by pleasure? nothing else than to choose present pleasure which
will result in greater evil; in other words, to embrace a greater evil
rather than a greater good; they, therefore, who are overcome by
pleasure are so from ignorance[92].
Having established this, Socrates recurs to the statement of Protagoras,
that courage differs from the other parts of virtue, because the most
unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant men, are
sometimes most courageous. It is admitted that no one willingly exposes
himself to things that he believes to be evil; a brave man, therefore,
incurs dangers which he knows to be honourable and good, and therefore
pleasant, and is influenced by no base fear, nor inspired with base
confidence; but the coward, on the contrary, is influenced by base fear
and inspired by base confidence; he errs, therefore, through ignorance
and want of knowledge, whence it follows that courage is contained in
knowledge. The result of the whole is that virtue, since it consists in
knowledge, can be taught, and so it turns out that Socrates, who began
by maintaining that it could not be taught, has been arguing all along
that it can, and Protagoras, who asserted that it could be taught, has
been arguing that it cannot.
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Footnote 92:
§ 91-118.
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PROTAGORAS,
OR
THE SOPHISTS.
A FRIEND, SOCRATES, HIPPOCRATES, PROTAGORAS, ALCIBIADES,
CALLIAS, CRITIAS, PRODICUS, AND HIPPIAS.
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_Fr._ Whence come you, Socrates? can there be any doubt but that it is
from a chase after the beauty of Alcibiades? and to me, indeed, when I
saw him lately, the man appeared still beautiful, though between
ourselves, Socrates, he is a man and is now getting a pretty thick
beard.
_Socr._ But what of that? Do you not approve of Homer[93], then, who
says, that the most graceful age is that of a youth with his first
beard, which is now the age of Alcibiades?
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Footnote 93:
Odyss. x. 279.
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_Fr._ What have we to do with that now? Do you come from him? And how is
the youth disposed towards you?
_Socr._ Very well, I think, and not least so to-day; for he has said
many things in my favour, assisting me, and indeed I have just now come
from him. However, I have something strange to tell you: for though he
was present I paid no attention to him, and even frequently forgot him.
2. _Fr._ But what great affair can have happened between you and him?
for surely you have not met with any one else more beautiful, in this
city at least?
_Socr._ By far.
_Fr._ What say you? A citizen, or a stranger?
_Socr._ A stranger.
_Fr._ From whence?
_Socr._ From Abdera.