The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum — Plato — John Shaqi
The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
On every subject, my boy, there is one method of beginning, for those
who mean to deliberate well; they must know what the thing is about
which the deliberation is to be, or else of necessity go altogether
astray. But it has escaped the notice of most men that they do not know
the essence of each several thing. As if they did know, then, they do
not agree with each other at the outset of the enquiry, and as they
proceed they pay the probable penalty, for they agree neither with
themselves nor with each other. Let not you and I, then, fall into the
error which we condemn in others, but since the question proposed to us
is, whether we ought rather to enter into a friendship with one who is
in love or not, having by mutual agreement settled on a definition of
love, what it is, and what power it has, and looking back and referring
to this, let us prosecute our enquiry whether it occasions advantage or
detriment. 30. That love, then, is a kind of desire, is clear to every
one; and we know that they who are not in love, desire beautiful things.
How then shall we distinguish a lover from one who is not in love? Here
it is necessary to observe, that in each of us there are two ruling and
leading principles, which we follow wherever they lead, one being an
innate desire of pleasures, the other an acquired opinion, which aims at
what is most excellent. These sometimes agree in us, and sometimes are
at variance; and sometimes one gets the upper hand, at other times the
other. When opinion therefore with the aid of reason leads to that which
is best, and gets the upper hand, we give the name of temperance to this
power; but when desire drags us irrationally to pleasures and rules
within us, this ruling power takes the name of excess. But excess has
many names; for it has many limbs and many forms. 31. And of these
principles whichever happens to get the predominance gives its own
designation to the person who possesses it, and that neither honourable
nor worth acquiring. For instance with respect to food, desire that gets
the better of the highest reason, and of the other desires, will be
called gluttony, and will cause the person who possesses it to be called
by the same name; again with respect to drinking, when it has usurped
dominion, by leading its possessor in this direction, it is clear what
designation it will acquire: and with respect to other things akin to
these, and the names of kindred desires, it is manifest how they ought
to be called, according as each for the time being happens to be
dominant. Why all this has been said is already pretty evident, but
every thing becomes in a manner more clear by being mentioned than if
not mentioned. 32. For desire without reason having got the upper hand
of opinion that tends to what is right, and being driven towards the
pleasure derived from beauty, and being strongly impelled by its kindred
desires to corporeal beauty, receives its name from this very strength
and is called love[120].