_Socr._ We ought not to reject a saying[128], which wise men utter, but should consider whether they say any thing worth attending to. Wherefore we must not pass by what you have now said. ----- Footnote 128: An expression taken from Homer, Iliad, iii. 65. ----- 93. _Phæ._ You are right. _Socr._ Let us then consider it as follows. _Phæ._ How? _Socr._ Suppose I should persuade you to purchase a horse for the purpose of repelling enemies, but both of us should be ignorant what a horse is, suppose, however, I did happen to know this much, that Phædrus believes a horse to be that tame animal which has the longest ears. _Phæ._ That would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates. _Socr._ Wait a moment: if I should earnestly persuade you, by composing a speech in praise of the ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that it is well worth while to purchase this beast both for domestic purposes and for military service, that he is useful to fight from, and able to carry baggage, and serviceable in many other respects. _Phæ._ This, now, would be perfectly ridiculous. _Socr._ But is it not better that a friend should be ridiculous, than dangerous and mischievous? _Phæ._ Clearly so. 94. _Socr._ When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, having found a city that is likewise so, endeavours to persuade it, not by celebrating the praises of an ass’s shadow[129], as if it were a horse, but of evil, as if it were good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude should persuade them to do evil instead of good, what kind of fruit do you suppose rhetoric will afterwards reap from such a sowing? ----- Footnote 129: A proverb meaning “a thing of no value.” See Suidas ὄνου σκιά. ----- _Phæ._ By no means a good one. _Socr._ But have we not, my good friend, reviled the art of speaking more roughly than is proper? for she may, perhaps, say: “Why, sirs, do you talk so foolishly? For I compel no one who is ignorant of the truth to learn how to speak: but if my advice is worth any thing, when he has acquired that, he then has recourse to me. This, then, I insist on, that without me one who knows the truth will not for all that be able to persuade by art.” _Phæ._ Will she not speak justly, in asserting this? 95. _Socr._ I admit it, at least if the arguments that assail her testify that she is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments coming up and insisting that she lies and is not an art, but an inartistic trick. But a genuine art of speaking, says the Spartan, without laying hold of truth, neither exists, nor ever can exist hereafter. _Phæ._ We must have these arguments, Socrates; so bring them forward and examine what they say, and in what manner. _Socr._ Come hither then, ye noble creatures, and persuade Phædrus with the beautiful children, that, unless he has sufficiently studied philosophy, he will never be competent to speak on any subject whatever. Let Phædrus answer then. _Phæ._ Put your questions.