“But it has been already granted,” said he, “that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less fully, a harmony, than another: is it not so?” “Certainly.” “And that that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized: is it so?” “It is.” “But does that which is neither more nor less harmonized partake of more or less harmony, or an equal amount?” “An equal amount.” 97. “A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?” “Even so.” “Such then being its condition, it cannot partake of a greater degree of discord or harmony?” “Certainly not.” “And again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue harmony?” “It cannot.” “Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will partake of vice, if it is harmony: for doubtless harmony, which is perfectly such, can never partake of discord?” “Certainly not.” “Neither, therefore, can a soul, which is perfectly a soul, partake of vice.” “How can it, from what has been already said?” “From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally good, if at least they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?” “It appears so to me, Socrates,” he said. “And does it appear to you,” he said, “to have been thus rightly argued, and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were correct, that the soul is harmony?” 98. “On no account whatever,” he replied. “But what,” said he, “of all the things that are in man, is there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be wise?” “I should say not.” “Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them? My meaning is this, for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking, and when hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we not?” “Certainly.” “But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would follow, and never govern them?” “We did allow it,” he replied, “for how could we do otherwise?”