“Immortal,” he replied. “Therefore does not the soul admit death?” “No.” “Is the soul, then, immortal?” “Immortal.” “Be it so,” he said. “Shall we say then, that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?” “Most completely, Socrates.” “What then,” said he, “Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?” “How should it not?” “If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat.” “You say truly,” he replied. “In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe.” “Of necessity,” he said. “Must we not then of necessity,” he continued, “speak thus of that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be dead, just as we said that three will never be even, nor again will the odd, nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127. But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make this objection, that it is not destroyed; for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have contended, that on the approach of the even the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest; might we not?” “Certainly.” “Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments.” “But there is no need,” he said, “as far as that is concerned; for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it.” 128. “The deity, indeed, I think,” said Socrates, “and the idea itself of life, and if any thing else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of dissolution.” “By Jupiter,” he replied, “by all men indeed, and still more, as I think, by the gods.” “Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?” “It must of necessity be so.” “When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?” “It appears so.”