Aristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no reflection is possible without pictures of the imagination. Nevertheless, what he says on this point,[122] οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή (_anima sine phantasmate nunquam intelligit_),[123] and ὅταν θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν (_qui contemplatur, necesse est, una cum phantasmate contempletur_),[124] and again, νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστι ἄνευ φαντάσματος (_fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam intelligatur_),[125]--made a strong impression upon the thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently and emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola,[126] for instance, says: _Necesse est, eum, qui ratiocinatur et intelligit, phantasmata speculari_;--Melanchthon[127] says: _Oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari_;--and Jord. Brunus[128] says, _dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari_. Pomponatius[129] expresses himself in the same sense.--On the whole, all that can be affirmed is, that every true and primary notion, every genuine philosophic theorem even, must have some sort of intuitive view for its innermost kernel or root. This, though something momentary[130] and single, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole analysis, however exhaustive it may be,--just as one drop of the right reagent suffices to tinge a whole solution with the colour of the precipitate which it causes. When an analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like a bank note issued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back it; whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere combinations of abstract conceptions, resembles a bank note which is issued by a firm which has nothing but other paper obligations to back it with. All mere rational talk thus renders the result of given conceptions clearer, but does not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light. It might therefore be left to each individual to do himself, instead of filling whole volumes every day. [122] Aristot. "De anima," iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8. [123] "The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image." [Tr.] [124] "He who observes anything must observe some image along with it." [Tr.] [125] "De Memoria," c. 1: "It is impossible to think without (the aid of) an image." [126] "De imaginatione," c. 5. [127] "De anima," p. 130. [128] "De compositione imaginum," p. 10. [129] "De immortalitate," pp. 54 et 70. [130] "_Ein Momentanes end Einheitliches._" § 29. _Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing._