judgments should have been pronounced _directly true_, and that this _intrinsic logical truth_ should have been distinguished from _extrinsic logical truth_, as attributed to all judgments which have another judgment for their reason, I cannot approve. Every truth is the reference of a judgment to something _outside_ of it, and the term _intrinsic truth_ is a contradiction. § 31. _Empirical Truth._ A judgment may be founded upon a representation of the first class, _i.e._ a perception by means of the senses, consequently on experience. In this case it has _material truth_, and moreover, if the judgment is founded _immediately_ on experience, this truth is _empirical truth_. When we say, "A judgment has _material truth_," we mean on the whole, that its conceptions are connected, separated, limited, according to the requirements of the intuitive representations through which it is inferred. To attain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the _faculty of judgment_, as the mediator between the intuitive and the abstract or discursive faculty of knowing--in other words, between the Understanding and the Reason. § 32. _Transcendental Truth._ The _forms_ of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie within the Understanding and pure Sensibility may, as conditions of all possible experience, be the grounds of a judgment, which is in that case synthetical _à priori_. As nevertheless this kind of judgment has material truth, its truth is _transcendental_; because the judgment is based not only on experience, but on the conditions of all possible experience lying within us. For it is determined precisely by that which determines experience itself: namely, either by the forms of Space and of Time perceived by us _à priori_, or by the causal law, known to us _à priori_. Propositions such as: two straight lines do not include a space; nothing happens without a cause; matter can neither come into being nor perish; 3 × 7 = 21, are examples of this kind of judgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no less my tables of the _Prædicabilia à priori_,[131] as well as most of Kant's theorems in his "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft," may, properly speaking, be adduced in corroboration of this kind of truth. [131] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 55. § 33. _Metalogical Truth._