On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
That peculiar faculty of the knowing Subject which enables it to obey
the will the more readily in repeating representations, the oftener
they have already been present to it--in other words, its capacity for
being exercised--is what we call _Memory_. I cannot agree with the
customary view, by which it is looked upon as a sort of store-house
in which we keep a stock of ready-made representations always at our
disposal, only without being always conscious of their possession.
The voluntary repetition of representations which have once been
present becomes so easy through practice, that one link in a series of
representations no sooner becomes present to us, than we at once evoke
all the rest, often even, as it were, involuntarily. If we were to look
for a metaphor for this characteristic quality of our representative
faculty (such as that of Plato, who compared it with a soft mass that
receives and retains impressions), I think the best would be that
of a piece of drapery, which, after having been repeatedly folded
in the same folds, at last falls into them, as it were, of its own
accord. The body learns by practice to obey the will, and the faculty
of representing does precisely the same. A remembrance is not by any
means, as the usual view supposes, always the same representation which
is, as it were, fetched over and over again from its store-house;
a new one, on the contrary, arises each time, only practice makes
this especially easy. Thus it comes to pass that pictures of our
imagination, which we fancy we have stowed away in our memory, become
imperceptibly modified: a thing which we realize when we see some
familiar object again after a long time, and find that it no longer
completely corresponds to the image we bring with us. This could not
be if we retained ready-made representations. It is just for this
reason too, that acquired knowledge, if left unexercised, gradually
fades from our memory, precisely because it was the result of practice
coming from habit and knack; thus most scholars, for instance, forget
their Greek, and most artists their Italian on their return from Italy.
This is also why we find so much difficulty in recalling to mind a
name or a line of poetry formerly familiar to us, when we have ceased
to think of it for several years; whereas when once we succeed in
remembering it, we have it again at our disposal for some time, because
the practice has been renewed. Everyone therefore who knows several
languages, will do well to make a point of reading occasionally in
each, that he may ensure to himself their possession.