On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
Proof, we find out that the law of causality is not so easily brought
to a standstill, and still persists in asking _why_: so it is simply
set aside and the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, which
from a distance resembles it, is substituted in its stead; and thus a
reason of knowledge is given in the place of the cause which had been
asked for--a reason of knowledge derived from the conception itself
which has to be demonstrated, the reality of which is therefore still
problematical: and this reason, as after all it is one, now has to
figure as a cause. Of course the conception itself has been previously
arranged for this purpose, and reality slightly covered with a few
husks just for decency's sake has been placed within it, so as to give
the delightful surprise of finding it there--as has been shown in
Section 7. On the other hand, if a chain of judgments ultimately rests
upon a principle of transcendental or of metalogical truth, and we
still continue to ask _why_, we receive no answer at all, because the
question has no meaning, _i.e._, it does not know what kind of reason
it is asking for.
For the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the _principle of all
explanation: to explain a thing_ means, to reduce its given existence
or connection to some form or other of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, in accordance with which form that existence or connection
necessarily is that which it is. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
itself, _i.e._, the connection expressed by it in any of its forms,
cannot therefore be further explained; because there exists no
principle by which to explain the source of all explanation: just as
the eye is unable to see itself, though it sees everything else.
There are of course series of motives, since the resolve to attain
an end becomes the motive for the resolve to use a whole series
of means; still this series invariably ends _à parte priori_ in a
representation belonging to one of our two first classes, in which lies
the motive which originally had the power to set this individual will
in motion. The fact that it was able to do this, is a datum for knowing
the empirical character here given, but it is impossible to answer
the question why that particular motive acts upon that particular
character; because the intelligible character lies outside Time and
never becomes an Object. Therefore the series of motives, as such,
finds its termination in some such final motive and, according to the
nature of its last link, passes into the series of causes, or that of
reasons of knowledge: that is to say, into the former, when that last
link is a real object; into the latter, when it is a mere conception.
§ 51. _Each Science has for its Guiding Thread one of the Forms of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason in preference to the others._