On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
I have endeavoured in this treatise to show that the Principle of
Sufficient Reason is a common expression for four completely different
relations, each of which is founded upon a particular law given _à
priori_ (the principle of sufficient reason being a synthetical _à
priori_ principle). Now, according to the principle of _homogeneity_,
we are compelled to assume that these four laws, discovered according
to the principle of specification, as they agree in being expressed
by one and the same term, must necessarily spring from one and the
same original quality of our whole cognitive faculty as their common
root, which we should accordingly have to look upon as the innermost
germ of all dependence, relativeness, instability and limitation of
the objects of our consciousness--itself limited to Sensibility,
Understanding, Reason, Subject and Object--or of that world, which
the divine Plato repeatedly degrades to the ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ
ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν (ever arising and perishing, but in
fact never existing), the knowledge of which is merely a δόξα μετ'
αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, and which Christendom, with a correct instinct,
calls _temporal_, after that form of our principle (Time) which I have
defined as its simplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.
The general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason may, in the
main, be brought back to this: that every thing existing no matter when
or where, exists _by reason of something else_. Now, the Principle of
Sufficient Reason is nevertheless _à priori_ in all its forms: that
is, it has its root in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied
to the totality of existent things, the Universe, including that
intellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this, which
presents itself in virtue of _à priori_ forms, is just on that account
mere phenomenon; consequently that which holds good with reference
to it as the result of these forms, cannot be applied to the world
itself, _i.e._ to the thing in itself, representing itself in that
world. Therefore we cannot say, "the world and all things in it exist
by reason of something else;" and this proposition is precisely the
Cosmological Proof.