On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
Even the three _Gunas_, or fundamental qualities of the Hindoos,
tally with the three physiological fundamental forces. _Tamas-Guna_,
obtuseness, stupidity, corresponds to reproductive power; _Rajas-Guna_,
passionateness, to irritability; and _Sattwa-Guna_, wisdom and virtue,
to sensibility. When however they add to this, that Tamas-Guna is
the fate of animals, Rajas-Guna the fate of man, and Sattwa-Guna
that of the Gods, this is to be taken in a mythological, rather than
physiological sense.
In Chapter 20th of the 2nd Vol. of my chief work entitled
"Objectification of the Will in the Animal Organism," I have likewise
treated the argument of the present chapter; therefore I advise
my readers to read it after this, as a complement to what is here
given.[210]
[210] In my "Parerga," § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd
edition) belongs also to the above.
I may observe, that the passages I have quoted from pp. 14 and 15 of my
Essay on Colours, refer to the first edition.
COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.
Now, from my proposition: that the Will is what Kant calls the "thing
in itself"[211] or the ultimate substratum of every phenomenon, I had
however not only deduced that the will is the agent in all inner,
unconscious functions of the body, but also that the organism itself is
nothing but the will which has entered the region of representation,
the will itself, perceived in the cognitive form of Space. I had
accordingly said that, just as each single momentary act of willing
presents itself at once directly and infallibly in the outer perception
of the body as one of its actions, so also must the collective volition
of each animal, the totality[212] of its efforts, be faithfully
portrayed in its whole body, in the constitution of its organism; and
that the means supplied by its organisation for attaining the aims of
its will must as a whole exactly correspond to those aims--in short,
that the same relation must exist between the whole character of its
volition and the shape and nature of its body, as between each single
act of its will and the single bodily action which carries it out. Even
this too has recently been recognised as a fact, and accordingly been
confirmed _à posteriori_, by thoughtful zootomists and physiologists
from their own point of view and independently of my doctrine: their
judgments on this point make Nature testify even here to the truth of
my theory.
[211] _Ding an sich._
[212] _Inbegriff._