On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
substantial source of knowledge--actually stands every moment in
inverse proportion to the interest which the will has in those things;
and knowing without willing is the condition, not to say the essence,
of all gifts of æsthetic intelligence. Why does an ordinary artist
produce so bad a painting of yonder landscape, notwithstanding all
the pains he has taken? Because he sees it so. And why does he see
so little beauty in it? Because his intellect has not freed itself
sufficiently from his will. The degrees of this separation give rise
to great intellectual distinctions between men; for the more knowledge
has freed itself from the will, the purer, consequently the more
objective and correct, it is; just as that fruit is best, which has no
after-taste of the soil on which it has grown.
This relation, as important as it is interesting, deserves surely to
be made still clearer by a retrospective view of the whole scale
of beings, and by recalling the gradual transition from absolute
subjectivity to the highest degrees of objectivity in the intellect.
Inorganic Nature namely, is absolutely subjective, no trace whatever of
consciousness of an outer world being found in it. Stones, boulders,
ice-blocks, even when they fall upon one another, or knock or rub
against one another, have no consciousness of each other and of an
outer world. Still even these are susceptible to external influence,
which causes their position and movement to change and may therefore
be considered as a first step towards consciousness. Now, although
plants also have no consciousness of the outer world, and although the
mere analogue of a consciousness which exists in them must, on the
contrary, be conceived as a dull self-enjoyment; yet we see that they
all seek light, and that many of them turn their flowers or leaves
daily towards the sun, while creepers find their way to supports
with which they are not in contact; and finally we see individual
kinds of plants show even a sort of irritability. Unquestionably
therefore, there is a connection and relation between their movements
and surroundings, even those with which they are not in immediate
contact; and this connection we must accordingly recognise as a
faint analogue to perception. With animal life first appears decided
perception--that is, consciousness of other things, as opposed to
that clear consciousness of ourselves to which that consciousness of
other things first gives rise. This constitutes precisely the true
character of animal-nature, as opposed to plant-nature. In the lowest
animals, consciousness of the outer world is very limited and dim: each
increasing degree of understanding extends it and makes it clearer,
and this gradual increase of the understanding again adapts itself
to the gradually increasing requirements of the animal, and thus the
process continues through the whole long ascending scale of the animal
series up to Man, in whom consciousness of the outer world reaches