On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
artist's memory, as they are _before_ this third intellectual process;
while we, who are not artists, cast them aside without retaining them
in our memory, as soon as we have made use of them for the purpose
described above. We shall become still better acquainted with this
third intellectual process by now passing on to a fourth, which, from
its intimate connection with the third, serves to elucidate it.
This _fourth_ operation of the Understanding consists in acquiring
knowledge of the distance of objects from us: it is this precisely
which constitutes that third dimension of which we have been speaking.
Visual sensation, as we have said, gives us the _direction_ in which
objects lie, but not their _distance_ from us: that is, not their
_position_. It is for the _Understanding_ therefore to find out this
distance; or, in other words, the distance must be inferred from
purely _causal_ determinations. Now the most important of these is the
_visual angle_, which objects subtend; yet even this is quite ambiguous
and unable to decide anything by itself. It is like a word of double
meaning: the sense, in which it is to be understood, can only be
gathered from its connection with the rest. An object subtending the
same visual angle may in fact be small and near, or large and far off;
and it is only when we have previously ascertained its size, that the
visual angle enables us to recognise its distance: and conversely,
its size, when its distance is known to us. Linear perspective is
based upon the fact that the visual angle diminishes as the distance
increases, and its principles may here be easily deduced. As our sight
ranges equally in all directions, we see everything in reality as from
the interior of a hollow sphere, of which our eye occupies the centre.
Now in the first place, an infinite number of intersecting circles pass
through the centre of this sphere in all directions, and the angles
measured by the divisions of these circles are the possible angles
of vision. In the second place, the sphere itself modifies its size
according to the length of radius we give to it; therefore we may also
imagine it as consisting of an infinity of concentric, transparent
spheres. As all radii diverge, these concentric spheres augment in
size in proportion to their distance from us, and the degrees of their
sectional circles increase correspondingly: therefore the true size
of the objects which occupy them likewise increases. Thus objects are
larger or smaller according to the size of the spheres of which they
occupy similar portions--say 10°--while their visual angle remains
unchanged in both cases, leaving it therefore undecided, whether the
10° occupied by a given object belong to a sphere of 2 miles, or of
10 feet diameter. Conversely, if the size of the object has been
ascertained, the number of degrees occupied by it will diminish in
proportion to the distance and the size of the sphere to which we