The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
If, however, we surrender ourselves to its teaching, we soon become
convinced that etiology cannot afford us the information we chiefly
desire, any more than morphology. The latter presents to us innumerable
and infinitely varied forms, which are yet related by an unmistakable
family likeness. These are for us ideas, and when only treated in this
way, they remain always strange to us, and stand before us like
hieroglyphics which we do not understand. Etiology, on the other hand,
teaches us that, according to the law of cause and effect, this particular
condition of matter brings about that other particular condition, and thus
it has explained it and performed its part. However, it really does
nothing more than indicate the orderly arrangement according to which the
states of matter appear in space and time, and teach in all cases what
phenomenon must necessarily appear at a particular time in a particular
place. It thus determines the position of phenomena in time and space,
according to a law whose special content is derived from experience, but
whose universal form and necessity is yet known to us independently of
experience. But it affords us absolutely no information about the inner
nature of any one of these phenomena: this is called a _force of nature_,
and it lies outside the province of causal explanation, which calls the
constant uniformity with which manifestations of such a force appear
whenever their known conditions are present, a _law of nature_. But this
law of nature, these conditions, and this appearance in a particular place
at a particular time, are all that it knows or ever can know. The force
itself which manifests itself, the inner nature of the phenomena which
appear in accordance with these laws, remains always a secret to it,
something entirely strange and unknown in the case of the simplest as well
as of the most complex phenomena. For although as yet etiology has most
completely achieved its aim in mechanics, and least completely in
physiology, still the force on account of which a stone falls to the
ground or one body repels another is, in its inner nature, not less
strange and mysterious than that which produces the movements and the
growth of an animal. The science of mechanics presupposes matter, weight,
impenetrability, the possibility of communicating motion by impact,
inertia and so forth as ultimate facts, calls them forces of nature, and
their necessary and orderly appearance under certain conditions a law of
nature. Only after this does its explanation begin, and it consists in
indicating truly and with mathematical exactness, how, where and when each
force manifests itself, and in referring every phenomenon which presents
itself to the operation of one of these forces. Physics, chemistry, and
physiology proceed in the same way in their province, only they presuppose
more and accomplish less. Consequently the most complete etiological
explanation of the whole of nature can never be more than an enumeration