The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Thus we see already that we can never arrive at the real nature of things
from without. However much we investigate, we can never reach anything but
images and names. We are like a man who goes round a castle seeking in
vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the façades. And yet this is
the method that has been followed by all philosophers before me.
§ 18. In fact, the meaning for which we seek of that world which is
present to us only as our idea, or the transition from the world as mere
idea of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this, would
never be found if the investigator himself were nothing more than the pure
knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he is himself rooted
in that world; he finds himself in it as an _individual_, that is to say,
his knowledge, which is the necessary supporter of the whole world as
idea, is yet always given through the medium of a body, whose affections
are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the understanding in the
perception of that world. His body is, for the pure knowing subject, an
idea like every other idea, an object among objects. Its movements and
actions are so far known to him in precisely the same way as the changes
of all other perceived objects, and would be just as strange and
incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not explained for him in an
entirely different way. Otherwise he would see his actions follow upon
given motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes
of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, or motives. But he would not
understand the influence of the motives any more than the connection
between every other effect which he sees and its cause. He would then call
the inner nature of these manifestations and actions of his body which he
did not understand a force, a quality, or a character, as he pleased, but
he would have no further insight into it. But all this is not the case;
indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who
appears as an individual, and the answer is _will_. This and this alone
gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance,
shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his
movements. The body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject
of knowledge, who becomes an individual only through his identity with it.
It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object among
objects and subject to the laws of objects. And it is also given in quite
a different way as that which is immediately known to every one, and is
signified by the word _will_. Every true act of his will is also at once
and without exception a movement of his body. The act of will and the
movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which
the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause
and effect; they are one and the same, but they are given in entirely