The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
§ 21. Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge _in
abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what every one knows
directly _in concreto_, _i.e._, as feeling, a knowledge that his will is
the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to
him as idea, both in his actions and in their permanent substratum, his
body, and that his will is that which is most immediate in his
consciousness, though it has not as such completely passed into the form
of idea in which object and subject stand over against each other, but
makes itself known to him in a direct manner, in which he does not quite
clearly distinguish subject and object, yet is not known as a whole to the
individual himself, but only in its particular acts,—whoever, I say, has
with me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him the
key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature; for he
now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like
his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but
only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_ alone. He will
recognise this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal
existences which exactly resemble his own, in men and animals as their
inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to recognise the
force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force
through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the
north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two
different kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective
affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and
combination, and, lastly, even gravitation, which acts so powerfully
throughout matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the
sun,—all these, I say, he will recognise as different only in their
phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as that
which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than
anything else, and which in its most distinct manifestation is called
_will_. It is this application of reflection alone that prevents us from
remaining any longer at the phenomenon, and leads us to the _thing in
itself_. Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea, of
whatever kind it may be, all _object_, is _phenomenal_ existence, but the
_will_ alone is a _thing in itself_. As such, it is throughout not idea,
but _toto genere_ different from it; it is that of which all idea, all
object, is the phenomenal appearance, the visibility, the objectification.
It is the inmost nature, the kernel, of every particular thing, and also
of the whole. It appears in every blind force of nature and also in the
preconsidered action of man; and the great difference between these two is
merely in the degree of the manifestation, not in the nature of what
manifests itself.