The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us that we know and
understand what will is far better than anything else whatever. The
concept of will has hitherto commonly been subordinated to that of force,
but I reverse the matter entirely, and desire that every force in nature
should be thought as will. It must not be supposed that this is mere
verbal quibbling or of no consequence; rather, it is of the greatest
significance and importance. For at the foundation of the concept of
force, as of all other concepts, there ultimately lies the knowledge in
sense-perception of the objective world, that is to say, the phenomenon,
the idea; and the concept is constructed out of this. It is an abstraction
from the province in which cause and effect reign, _i.e._, from ideas of
perception, and means just the causal nature of causes at the point at
which this causal nature is no further etiologically explicable, but is
the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept
will, on the other hand, is of all possible concepts the only one which
has its source _not_ in the phenomenal, _not_ in the mere idea of
perception, but comes from within, and proceeds from the most immediate
consciousness of each of us, in which each of us knows his own
individuality, according to its nature, immediately, apart from all form,
even that of subject and object, and which at the same time is this
individuality, for here the subject and the object of knowledge are one.
If, therefore, we refer the concept of _force_ to that of _will_, we have
in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely better known;
indeed, to the one thing that is really immediately and fully known to us,
and have very greatly extended our knowledge. If, on the contrary, we
subsume the concept of will under that of force, as has hitherto always
been done, we renounce the only immediate knowledge which we have of the
inner nature of the world, for we allow it to disappear in a concept which
is abstracted from the phenomenal, and with which we can therefore never
go beyond the phenomenal.