The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Whatever the thing-in-itself may be, Kant is right in his conclusion that
time, space, and causality (which we afterwards found to be forms of the
principle of sufficient reason, the general expression of the forms of the
phenomenon) are not its properties, but come to it only after, and so far
as, it has become idea. That is, they belong only to its phenomenal
existence, not to itself. For since the subject fully understands and
constructs them out of itself, independently of all object, they must be
dependent upon _existence as idea_ as such, not upon that which becomes
idea. They must be the form of the idea as such; but not qualities of that
which has assumed this form. They must be already given with the mere
antithesis of subject and object (not as concepts but as facts), and
consequently they must be only the more exact determination of the form of
knowledge in general, whose most universal determination is that
antithesis itself. Now, that in the phenomenon, in the object, which is in
its turn conditioned by time, space and causality, inasmuch as it can only
become idea by means of them, namely _multiplicity_, through co-existence
and succession, _change_ and _permanence_ through the law of causality,
_matter_ which can only become idea under the presupposition of causality,
and lastly, all that becomes idea only by means of these,—all this, I say,
as a whole, does not in reality belong to that which appears, to that
which has passed into the form of idea, but belongs merely to this form
itself. And conversely, that in the phenomenon which is not conditioned
through time, space and causality, and which cannot be referred to them,
nor explained in accordance with them, is precisely that in which the
thing manifested, the thing-in-itself, directly reveals itself. It follows
from this that the most complete capacity for being known, that is to say,
the greatest clearness, distinctness, and susceptibility of exhaustive
explanation, will necessarily belong to that which pertains to knowledge
_as such_, and thus to the _form_ of knowledge; but not to that which in
itself is not idea, not object, but which has become knowledge only
through entering these forms; in other words, has become idea, object.
Thus only that which depends entirely upon being an object of knowledge,
upon existing as idea in general and _as such_ (not upon that which
_becomes_ known, and has only _become_ idea), which therefore belongs
without distinction to everything that is known, and which, on that
account, is found just as well if we start from the subject as if we start
from the object,—this alone can afford us without reserve a sufficient,
exhaustive knowledge, a knowledge which is clear to the very foundation.
But this consists of nothing but those forms of all phenomena of which we
are conscious _a priori_, and which may be generally expressed as the
principle of sufficient reason. Now, the forms of this principle which