The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
force obtains a right to it and temporarily takes possession of it, in
order to appear and reveal its own nature. The condition of this right,
the point of time and space at which it becomes valid, is given by
causality, but the explanation founded upon this law only extends thus
far. The force itself is a manifestation of will, and as such is not
subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, that is, it is
groundless. It lies outside all time, is omnipresent, and seems as it were
to wait constantly till the circumstances occur under which it can appear
and take possession of a definite matter, supplanting the forces which
have reigned in it till then. All time exists only for the phenomena of
such a force, and is without significance for the force itself. Through
thousands of years chemical forces slumber in matter till the contact with
the reagents sets them free; then they appear; but time exists only for
the phenomena, not for the forces themselves. For thousands of years
galvanism slumbered in copper and zinc, and they lay quietly beside
silver, which must be consumed in flame as soon as all three are brought
together under the required conditions. Even in the organic kingdom we see
a dry seed preserve the slumbering force through three thousand years, and
when at last the favourable circumstances occur, grow up as a plant.(35)
If by this exposition the difference between a force of nature and all its
phenomena has been made quite distinct; if we have seen clearly that the
former is the will itself at this particular grade of its objectification,
but that multiplicity comes to phenomena only through time and space, and
that the law of causality is nothing but the determination of the position
of these phenomena in time and space; then we shall recognise the complete
truth and the deep meaning of Malebranche’s doctrine of occasional causes
(_causes occasionelles_). It is well worth while comparing this doctrine
of his, as he explains it in the “_Recherches de la Vérite_,” both in the
3rd Chapter of the second part of the 6th Book, and in the
_éclaircissements_ appended to this chapter, with this exposition of mine,
and observing the complete agreement of the two doctrines in the case of
such different systems of thought. Indeed I cannot help admiring how
Malebranche, though thoroughly involved in the positive dogmas which his
age inevitably forced upon him, yet, in such bonds and under such a
burden, hit the truth so happily, so correctly, and even knew how to
combine it with these dogmas, at all events verbally.