The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
conqueror he oppresses nations, throws a world into lamentation, and sheds
the blood of millions; this is the outward form of his manifestation, that
which is unessential to it, and depends upon the circumstances in which
fate has placed him, upon his surroundings, upon external influences, upon
motives; but his decision upon these motives can never be explained from
them; it proceeds from the will, of which this man is a manifestation. Of
this we shall speak in the Fourth Book. The manner in which the character
discloses its qualities is quite analogous to the way in which those of
every material body in unconscious nature are disclosed. Water remains
water with its intrinsic qualities, whether as a still lake it reflects
its banks, or leaps in foam from the cliffs, or, artificially confined,
spouts in a long jet into the air. All that depends upon external causes;
the one form is as natural to it as the other, but it will always show the
same form in the same circumstances; it is equally ready for any, but in
every case true to its character, and at all times revealing this alone.
So will every human character under all circumstances reveal itself, but
the phenomena which proceed from it will always be in accordance with the
circumstances.
§ 27. If, from the foregoing consideration of the forces of nature and
their phenomena, we have come to see clearly how far an explanation from
causes can go, and where it must stop if it is not to degenerate into the
vain attempt to reduce the content of all phenomena to their mere form, in
which case there would ultimately remain nothing but form, we shall be
able to settle in general terms what is to be demanded of etiology as a
whole. It must seek out the causes of all phenomena in nature, _i.e._, the
circumstances under which they invariably appear. Then it must refer the
multitude of phenomena which have various forms in various circumstances
to what is active in every phenomenon, and is presupposed in the
cause,—original forces of nature. It must correctly distinguish between a
difference of the phenomenon which arises from a difference of the force,
and one which results merely from a difference of the circumstances under
which the force expresses itself; and with equal care it must guard
against taking the expressions of one and the same force under different
circumstances for the manifestations of different forces, and conversely
against taking for manifestations of one and the same force what
originally belongs to different forces. Now this is the direct work of the
faculty of judgment, and that is why so few men are capable of increasing
our insight in physics, while all are able to enlarge experience.
Indolence and ignorance make us disposed to appeal too soon to original
forces. This is exemplified with an exaggeration that savours of irony in
the entities and quidities of the schoolmen. Nothing is further from my
desire than to favour their resuscitation. We have just as little right to