The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
All this is accomplished by the inner power of an artistic nature alone;
but that purely objective disposition is facilitated and assisted from
without by suitable objects, by the abundance of natural beauty which
invites contemplation, and even presses itself upon us. Whenever it
discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost always succeeds in
delivering us, though it may be only for a moment, from subjectivity, from
the slavery of the will, and in raising us to the state of pure knowing.
This is why the man who is tormented by passion, or want, or care, is so
suddenly revived, cheered, and restored by a single free glance into
nature: the storm of passion, the pressure of desire and fear, and all the
miseries of willing are then at once, and in a marvellous manner, calmed
and appeased. For at the moment at which, freed from the will, we give
ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we pass into a world from which
everything is absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently
through it. This freeing of knowledge lifts us as wholly and entirely away
from all that, as do sleep and dreams; happiness and unhappiness have
disappeared; we are no longer individual; the individual is forgotten; we
are only pure subject of knowledge; we are only that _one_ eye of the
world which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which can become
perfectly free from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference
of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether
the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for
neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us. So near us
always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our misery; but who has
the strength to continue long in it? As soon as any single relation to our
will, to our person, even of these objects of our pure contemplation,
comes again into consciousness, the magic is at an end; we fall back into
the knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason; we
know no longer the Idea, but the particular thing, the link of a chain to
which we also belong, and we are again abandoned to all our woe. Most men
remain almost always at this standpoint because they entirely lack
objectivity, _i.e._, genius. Therefore they have no pleasure in being
alone with nature; they need company, or at least a book. For their
knowledge remains subject to their will; they seek, therefore, in objects,
only some relation to their will, and whenever they see anything that has
no such relation, there sounds within them, like a ground bass in music,
the constant inconsolable cry, “It is of no use to me;” thus in solitude
the most beautiful surroundings have for them a desolate, dark, strange,
and hostile appearance.