The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Since, on the one hand, every given thing may be observed in a. purely
objective manner and apart from all relations; and since, on the other
hand, the will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its
objectivity, so that everything is the expression of an Idea; it follows
that everything is also _beautiful_. That even the most insignificant
things admit of pure objective and will-less contemplation, and thus prove
that they are beautiful, is shown by what was said above in this reference
about the Dutch pictures of still-life (§ 38). But one thing is more
beautiful than another, because it makes this pure objective contemplation
easier, it lends itself to it, and, so to speak, even compels it, and then
we call it very beautiful. This is the case sometimes because, as an
individual thing, it expresses in its purity the Idea of its species by
the very distinct, clearly defined, and significant relation of its parts,
and also fully reveals that Idea through the completeness of all the
possible expressions of its species united in it, so that it makes the
transition from the individual thing to the Idea, and therefore also the
condition of pure contemplation, very easy for the beholder. Sometimes
this possession of special beauty in an object lies in the fact that the
Idea itself which appeals to us in it is a high grade of the objectivity
of will, and therefore very significant and expressive. Therefore it is
that man is more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of
his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and expression are the
most important objects of plastic art, and human action the most important
object of poetry. Yet each thing has its own peculiar beauty, not only
every organism which expresses itself in the unity of an individual being,
but also everything unorganised and formless, and even every manufactured
article. For all these reveal the Ideas through which the will objectifies
itself at its lowest grades, they give, as it were, the deepest resounding
bass-notes of nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light, and so forth,
are the Ideas which express themselves in rocks, in buildings, in waters.
Landscape-gardening or architecture can do no more than assist them to
unfold their qualities distinctly, fully, and variously; they can only
give them the opportunity of expressing themselves purely, so that they
lend themselves to æsthetic contemplation and make it easier. Inferior
buildings or ill-favoured localities, on the contrary, which nature has
neglected or art has spoiled, perform this task in a very slight degree or
not at all; yet even from them these universal, fundamental Ideas of
nature cannot altogether disappear. To the careful observer they present
themselves here also, and even bad buildings and the like are capable of
being æsthetically considered; the Ideas of the most universal properties
of their materials are still recognisable in them, only the artificial