The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Tragedy is to be regarded, and is recognised as the summit of poetical
art, both on account of the greatness of its effect and the difficulty of
its achievement. It is very significant for our whole system, and well
worthy of observation, that the end of this highest poetical achievement
is the representation of the terrible side of life. The unspeakable pain,
the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance,
and the irretrievable fall of the just and innocent, is here presented to
us; and in this lies a significant hint of the nature of the world and of
existence. It is the strife of will with itself, which here, completely
unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, comes into fearful
prominence. It becomes visible in the suffering of men, which is now
introduced, partly through chance and error, which appear as the rulers of
the world, personified as fate, on account of their insidiousness, which
even reaches the appearance of design; partly it proceeds from man
himself, through the self-mortifying efforts of a few, through the
wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same will that lives
and appears in them all, but whose phenomena fight against each other and
destroy each other. In one individual it appears powerfully, in another
more weakly; in one more subject to reason, and softened by the light of
knowledge, in another less so, till at last, in some single case, this
knowledge, purified and heightened by suffering itself, reaches the point
at which the phenomenon, the veil of Mâya, no longer deceives it. It sees
through the form of the phenomenon, the _principium individuationis_. The
egoism which rests on this perishes with it, so that now the _motives_
that were so powerful before have lost their might, and instead of them
the complete knowledge of the nature of the world, which has a _quieting_
effect on the will, produces resignation, the surrender not merely of
life, but of the very will to live. Thus we see in tragedies the noblest
men, after long conflict and suffering, at last renounce the ends they
have so keenly followed, and all the pleasures of life for ever, or else
freely and joyfully surrender life itself. So is it with the steadfast
prince of Calderon; with Gretchen in “Faust;” with Hamlet, whom his friend
Horatio would willingly follow, but is bade remain a while, and in this
harsh world draw his breath in pain, to tell the story of Hamlet, and
clear his memory; so also is it with the Maid of Orleans, the Bride of
Messina; they all die purified by suffering, _i.e._, after the will to
live which was formerly in them is dead. In the “Mohammed” of Voltaire
this is actually expressed in the concluding words which the dying Palmira
addresses to Mohammad: “The world is for tyrants: live!” On the other
hand, the demand for so-called poetical justice rests on entire
misconception of the nature of tragedy, and, indeed, of the nature of the
world itself.