The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
direct contradiction of the will with itself. The imitation of the
qualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much more shameful than to dress
in other people’s clothes; for it is the judgment of our own worthlessness
pronounced by ourselves. Knowledge of our own mind and its capacities of
every kind, and their unalterable limits, is in this respect the surest
way to the attainment of the greatest possible contentment with ourselves.
For it holds good of inward as of outward circumstances that there is for
us no consolation so effective as the complete certainty of unalterable
necessity. No evil that befalls us pains us so much as the thought of the
circumstances by which it might have been warded off. Therefore nothing
comforts us so effectually as the consideration of what has happened from
the standpoint of necessity, from which all accidents appear as tools in
the hand of an overruling fate, and we therefore recognise the evil that
has come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of inner and outer
circumstances; in other words, fatalism. We really only complain and storm
so long as we hope either to affect others or to excite ourselves to
unheard-of efforts. But children and grown-up people know very well to
yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see that it absolutely cannot be
otherwise:—Θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσσαντες ἀνάγκη (_Animo in
pectoribus nostro domito necessitate_). We are like the entrapped
elephants, that rage and struggle for many days, till they see that it is
useless, and then suddenly offer their necks quietly to the yoke, tamed
for ever. We are like King David, who, as long as his son still lived,
unceasingly importuned Jehovah with prayers, and behaved himself as if in
despair; but as soon as his son was dead, thought no longer about it.
Hence it arises that innumerable permanent ills, such as lameness,
poverty, low estate, ugliness, a disagreeable dwelling-place, are borne
with indifference by innumerable persons, and are no longer felt, like
healed wounds, just because these persons know that inward or outward
necessity renders it impossible that any change can take place in these
things; while those who are more fortunate cannot understand how such
misfortunes can be borne. Now as with outward necessity, so also with
inward; nothing reconciles so thoroughly as a distinct knowledge of it. If
we have once for all distinctly recognised not only our good qualities and
our strength, but also our defects and weakness, established our aim
accordingly, and rest satisfied concerning what cannot be attained, we
thus escape in the surest way, as far as our individuality permits, the
bitterest of all sorrows, discontentment with ourselves, which is the
inevitable result of ignorance of our own individuality, of false conceit
and the audacity that proceeds from it. To the bitter chapter of the
self-knowledge here recommended the lines of Ovid admit of excellent
application—